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Abstract  
Since devolution in the late 1990s, education policy in England has diverged further from that 
in Scotland and also from policy in Wales and Northern Ireland. In this paper we review the 
roots and trajectory of the English education reforms over the past two decades. Our focus is 
the schools sector, though we also touch on adjoining reforms to early years and further and 
higher education. In so doing, we engage with various themes, including marketization, 
institutional autonomy, and accountability. Changes in governance arrangements for schools 
have been a defining feature of education reforms since devolution. This has been set against 
an evolution in national performance indicators that has put government priorities into ever 
sharper relief. In theorising the changes, we pay particular attention to the suggestion that 
the English education system now epitomises the concept of ‘network governance’, which has 
also been applied to education in a global context. We question the extent to which policies 
have in practice moved beyond the well-established mechanisms of ‘steering at a distance’ 
and undermined the very notion of an education system in England. We conclude by 
considering possible futures for education policy and how they may position England in 
relation to other parts of the UK and the wider world. 
Keywords: education policy; England; schools; social democracy; marketization; network 
governance 
Introduction 
English and Scottish education policies were markedly different well before parliamentary 
devolution in 1998, especially in relation to schools policy, which had long been a devolved 
responsibility in administrative terms. Education policies in Wales and Northern Ireland had 
hitherto been much more similar to those in England, although with some distinctive 
characteristics of their own. However, a peculiarly English approach to education reform 
had already begun to emerge since the 1988 Education Reform Act (ERA) and 1992 
Education (Schools) Act. Although other jurisdictions had their own watered down versions 
of the ERA, devolution in 1998 allowed them to break free and follow their own paths. 
England, however, continued to follow the direction set by the Thatcher government in the 
1980s. 
During the 1970s there had been growing antipathy in England towards the ‘swollen state’ 
of the immediate post-war years. This was largely for economic reasons concerning the level 
of public expenditure. But under the 1979 Thatcher government it became coupled with a 
market choice critique of public sector management. In the case of education this focused 
increasingly on the role of the so-called ‘educational establishment’—principally left-leaning 
teaching unions, inspectors and teacher trainers—who seemed to favour what the 
Conservatives saw as highly questionable ‘progressive’ or ‘child-centred’ approaches to 
teaching. Local Education Authorities (LEAs) were also implicated, their central role in the 
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allocation of school places seen as stifling the need for schools to innovate or to respond 
efficiently, if at all, to parental concerns (Shleifer, 1998). Taken together, the Conservatives 
argued, ‘progressive’ teaching methods and state allocation of places had brought a dull 
uniformity to the system and a levelling down of standards. Accordingly, throughout their 
time in office, the Conservative governments of Margaret Thatcher and John Major acted to 
increase the power of the ‘consumer’ and reduce that of the ‘producers’. They did so 
through the introduction of greater parental choice over the school their children would 
attend, and increased differentiation of the types of schools parents could choose from. This 
was achieved in part by introducing new types of school, such as grant maintained schools 
and city technology colleges, autonomous from local authorities. Another new type of 
school – the specialist school – was permitted to select up to 10 per cent of pupils on the 
basis of aptitude for the school’s specialism. These schools also had greater freedoms in 
relation to the curriculum. This was coupled with per capita funding and the devolution of 
many LEA responsibilities, including funding decisions, to virtually all schools so that they 
could respond to the market.  
 
However, while the Conservatives were enthusiastic about making schools more receptive 
to parents’ wishes, they were unwilling to relinquish control over the outcomes that schools 
should achieve. In this, Conservative education policy provides a clear illustration of the 
tendency for liberal democracies to develop along the lines of the ‘strong state’ and the 
‘free economy’ (Gamble, 1988) and the associated shift in the way the public sector is co-
ordinated and controlled by government, to what can be characterized as ‘steering at a 
distance’. While devolution of responsibilities to individual organisations appears to offer 
them greater autonomy, the state retains overall strategic control by setting the outputs 
that providers need to achieve and publishing details of their performance against them 
(Neave, 1988; Whitty et al., 1998). These indicators arguably influence the priorities of 
service users, who in turn reinforce the pressure on providers to work to them (Adnett and 
Davies, 2003). Examples of such central steering mechanisms under the Conservatives 
included the establishment of the National Curriculum and its associated system of 
assessment, and the introduction of a new and more intensive approach to school 
inspection through the Office for Standards in Education (Ofsted), a new non-ministerial 
government department. Given the relationship between the profile of a school’s pupil 
intake in terms of prior ability and its performance in league tables, these policies made the 
issue of school autonomy over admissions one of growing significance within the English 
system.  
 
In the 1997 general election the Conservative party was heavily defeated by New Labour, 
under the leadership of Tony Blair. There was, however, a good deal of continuity between 
the two parties’ education policies in England. Indeed, in some respects, the New Labour 
government took both competition and central steering much further than the 
Conservatives had. Under New Labour this basic policy framework was presented in terms 
of furthering social justice through a modernized public sector. This reflected New Labour’s 
founding commitment to the ‘Third Way’, a concept that Tony Blair adopted enthusiastically 
as part of his modernisation of the Labour party and abandonment of what were regarded 
as outdated ideologies (Blair, 1998). Formulated by the sociologist Anthony Giddens, the 
Third Way was a pragmatic approach that sought to marry social democracy and the 
market.  
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In schools policy there were major new investments intended to raise standards, under the 
banner of ‘a high quality education for all’. These supported a significant extension of early 
years provision, successive area-based interventions to address poorly performing schools 
(e.g. Education Action Zones, Excellence in Cities, London Challenge), as well as efforts to 
improve the wellbeing of children and young people – delivered through a constellation of 
policies known as Every Child Matters. In New Labour’s second and third terms of office 
there was a shift in emphasis, from that of simply raising standards to also narrowing the 
socio-economic attainment gap between pupils from advantaged and disadvantaged 
backgrounds. The result was the introduction of more targeted interventions in order to 
focus additional resources on pupils who needed greater support, one example being the 
literacy scheme Reading Recovery. A notable feature of this policy landscape was the way in 
which New Labour worked through a number of existing and new ‘quangos’ to take forward 
its policies, including the Qualifications and Curriculum Development Agency, Training and 
Development Agency for Schools, and the British Educational Communications and 
Technology Agency. All this sat, though, against the backdrop of a continued push for a 
greater diversity of autonomous schools, publication of performance data, and parental 
choice. Meanwhile, building on the National Curriculum, a series of ‘national strategies’, first 
for literacy and numeracy and then for the primary and secondary phases as a whole, 
provided the basis for further shaping the work of schools in a marketised system. Early 
years provision received the same treatment, including the introduction of the Early Years 
Foundation Stage and related standards.  
 
In higher education policy New Labour placed a strong emphasis on widening participation, 
the ‘flagship’ target being to achieve a 50 per cent participation rate in higher education 
among the 18-30 age group (see Whitty et al., 2016, chapter 5). This was combined with the 
dramatic development of introducing tuition fees for UK first degree students. The latter 
was based on the principle that students were as much a beneficiary of attending university 
as wider society and should therefore make a direct contribution to the costs of their study; 
the funding of higher education through general taxation was presented as being regressive. 
When Scotland subsequently abolished fees for its own students, English and Scottish higher 
education policy diverged, while the other UK jurisdictions adopted variants of the English 
approach albeit with limited enthusiasm.   
 
In post-compulsory education the New Labour administration will be most remembered for 
its rejection of the Tomlinson Report of 2004 and the recommendation to create a single 
diploma qualification for the 14-19 phase. The later ‘compromise’ of introducing a 14-19 
Diploma to sit alongside A-levels was short-lived, though the policy to raise the participation 
age was more positively received. More generally, New Labour’s governance of the further 
education and skills sector often appeared to lack coherence: in particular, in many 
instances it was seemingly unable or unwilling to steer the sector more decisively – not least 
in relation to the repeated calls for a better fit between provision and economic and 
employer need (Lupton et al., 2015). 
 
Overall, in the immediate years following devolution, education policy in England was 
characterised by a continued shift away from two long established planks of social 
democratic thinking about education that remained more firmly intact in many other parts 
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of the UK – comprehensive secondary schooling and free higher education. But there were 
many tensions, compromises and nuances in this drift away from the other UK nations 
under New Labour. These centred first and foremost on selection and school autonomy, 
especially in relation to admissions. The tuition fees policy arguably generated somewhat 
less overt soul searching within the Labour party at large, even though it led to one of the 
largest revolts in the Parliamentary Labour Party during the passage of the 2004 Higher 
Education Act. Higher Education policy is covered in detail in another contribution to this 
special issue (Hillman, 2016), so will not be addressed further in this article. In schools 
policy, the effects of successive Coalition and Conservative education policies after 2010 
would pose a fresh challenge to the Labour party’s commitment to social democratic 
principles in schools policy and even conflict within the party as a whole.    
 
The demise of social democracy? 
After Labour’s failure to end academic selection at 11+ during its periods in office in the 1960s 
and 1970s, the extent of its continuing commitment to comprehensive education had by the 
1990s become a vexed issue. Party sound bites from the 1992 general election suggested a 
renewed commitment to the abandonment of any selection within the state education system 
and the re-assertion of LEA control over maintained schools (see, for example, The 
Independent, 26th February 1992). It was following Labour’s fourth successive general election 
defeat that the party moved towards a position that accepted, and then embraced, a version of 
the diversity and choice policies that were being pursued by the Conservatives. These were 
often based on – or certainly accepted – elements of overt selection across the secondary 
schools system; in other respects, this policy also raised concerns about covert selection.  
 
Although the New Labour government did not support the creation of new state-funded 
grammar schools (and abolished the Assisted Places Scheme that had provided support for 
children of modest means to attend academically selective private schools), it was in the name 
of parental choice that the party side-stepped the so-called ‘grammar school question’ (Crook 
et al., 2000). As Blair told an audience in Birmingham during the 1997 general election 
campaign, ‘so far as the existing … grammar schools are concerned, as long as the parents want 
them, they will stay. … We will tackle what isn't working, not what is.’ (Blair, 1997).  
Accordingly, immediately after its election victory, New Labour published proposals to allow 
parents to decide the fate of existing grammar schools or of area-wide selection where it still 
existed. The 1998 School Standards and Framework Act thus included provisions by which local 
communities could petition for a ballot to end academic selection. Several petitions were 
launched but only one received the signatures of 20 per cent of eligible parents, the threshold 
needed to trigger a ballot. In this ballot, which was for Ripon Grammar School, parents rejected 
an end to selection by a ratio of 2:1. There therefore remained 164 grammar schools in 
England, located in 36 of the 150 local authorities; of these 36, only the 15 fully selective 
local authorities had substantial numbers of pupils attending grammar schools. 
 
New Labour went on to implicitly endorse the principle of overt selection in other ways. The 
1997 White Paper, Excellence in Schools (DfEE, 1997), and the aforementioned 1998 School 
Standards and Framework Act that followed it, continued the previous administration’s 
support for specialist schools; while the Act placed rather less emphasis on these schools’ 
selective character, it nevertheless permitted any school to select 10 per cent of pupils on 
aptitude if the governing body was satisfied that the school had a specialism. Coldron et al. 
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(2009) note that although the great majority of specialist schools did not use selection, the 
potential was there for them to do so.  
 
There were continuing calls from organisations like the Campaign for State Education (CASE) 
and Comprehensive Future throughout the period of New Labour government – and beyond – 
for the Labour party leadership to tackle the remaining grammar schools. However, the more 
ambiguous territory of ‘choice and diversity’ had won out. Some in the party went so far as to 
dismiss the comprehensive school altogether as ‘an institution of the past – part of the social 
democratic agenda of the Sixties and therefore of no relevance to the world of the Nineties’ 
(cited in Chitty, 1994, p.89). Other contributions from centre-left writers at this time saw 
benefit in overt selection: in their 1997 publication, A Class Act, Adonis and Pollard argued that 
‘for all the good intentions, the destruction of the grammar schools…had the effect of 
reinforcing class divisions’ (p. 61).  
 
Accordingly, the amount of differentiation among schools grew under New Labour, and its 
rhetoric increasingly emphasised a supposed link between school diversity and higher 
standards. This was made clear by Tony Blair in a 2006 speech, where he commented that 
‘over time I shifted from saying “it’s standards, not structures” to realising that school 
structures could affect standards’ (Blair, 2006). As under the previous Conservative 
government, the key ingredient for linking differentiation to standards and excellence 
remained choice; this was illustrated by the 2005 schools White Paper, which had argued 
against ignoring ‘the reality that the vast majority of parents want a real choice of excellent 
schools’ (DfES, 2005: 8). New Labour chose to maintain something of the Conservative 
distinction between local authority and grant maintained status, albeit under the new titles 
of ‘community’ and ‘foundation’ schools. In addition, it retained the city technology colleges 
(CTCs), to which were added (city) academies, and trust schools. Many of these schools 
were also specialist schools, and so the number and proportion of these schools increased 
significantly; others were also faith schools. A new Schools Commissioner would act as a 
‘champion’ of increased diversity and choice.   
 
Academies in particular became a totemic policy for New Labour (and for the Coalition and 
Conservative administrations that followed). Their origins lay in the aforementioned CTCs, a 
new form of state-funded secondary school for the inner-city that sat entirely outside the 
inﬂuence of LEAs. The plan was for CTCs to be run by independent trusts, with capital 
funding coming from the private sector and the state providing recurrent funding. In 
practice, however, few business sponsors came forward, the Thatcher government covered 
virtually all funding, and the number of CTCs remained small (Whitty et al., 1993). Under 
New Labour, academies were introduced explicitly to tackle failing local authority run 
schools, which were typically in deprived areas (NAO, 2007). Some academies were new 
schools; others were existing schools that had not responded to earlier ‘turnaround’ 
initiatives. All had sponsors, typically with business connections, who in these early days of 
academies were required to contribute to capital costs. 
 
As Education Minister, Estelle Morris (2001) stated that specialist schools were ‘only 
modern comprehensive schools’, implying that they had no special advantages. But at least 
until they became the majority of secondary schools, the specialist school label clearly 
differentiated them from what Tony Blair’s official spokesman, Alastair Campbell, termed 
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‘bog-standard’ comprehensive schools (Campbell, 2007). While the apparently superior 
performance of specialist schools added impetus to the policy of differentiation (Jesson and 
Crossley, 2006), the fact that this performance may have been partly due to the nature of 
their pupil intakes was not always acknowledged (Sutton Trust, 2006). Although it had 
always been the case that all sorts of schools that were nominally comprehensive lacked 
balanced intakes, either socially or academically or indeed both, the charge was that school 
choice and school autonomy, including over admissions, would now make it possible for far 
more schools to select covertly as well as overtly (Gewirtz et al., 1995; Newsam, 2003). 
Academies became an important category of school in this regard, while selection by faith 
schools also came under the spotlight (Penlington, 2001). 
 
So, for a time, the debate about overt academic selection took second place to a debate 
about whether covert social selection, and by implication covert academic selection, was 
taking place in the new diverse school system. A major issue of contention between the 
proponents and opponents of diversity was the effect of some but not all schools being their 
own admissions authorities. For example, Tough and Brooks (2007) found that schools that 
were their own admissions authorities had intakes that were far less representative of their 
surrounding areas than schools where the local authority was the admissions authority. In 
2005 and 2006, the Sutton Trust looked at the social composition of the ‘top 200’ 
comprehensives in England and identified a group of high attaining schools that were more 
socially exclusive than the national average and other schools in their areas (Sutton Trust, 
2006). It concluded that this mismatch could be explained by a number of factors, including 
covert social selection.  
 
Such covert selection was an area of concern for the House of Commons Education and 
Skills Committee in its review of the 2005 schools White Paper, and its report to 
government prompted some significant concessions on admissions policy, mainly around 
the status of the admissions code (DfES, 2006; House of Commons Education and Skills 
Committee, 2006). In an attempt to address covert selection (whether intended or 
unintended), the new code prohibited schools from giving priority to children on the basis of 
their interests or knowledge, and this was combined with free school transport to open up 
choice to less advantaged families, and ‘choice advisers’ to assist these families in 
negotiating their child’s transition to secondary school (DfES, 2005). Later research by Allen 
et al. (2012) has suggested that the 2003 and 2007 admission codes did reduce social 
segregation between schools to a limited extent.  
 
Left of centre opponents of New Labour continued to argue that such measures would not 
be enough to overcome covert selection and ‘playing the system’ by knowledgeable middle 
class families, so they united around a call for ‘good schools in all areas, for all children’ (e.g. 
Education Alliance, 2006). However, any attempt to return to traditional catchment areas 
after two decades of choice was unlikely to be attractive politically. An attempt by one local 
authority, Brighton, to run admissions lotteries as an alternative way of dealing with covert 
selection proved even more contentious (see Laville and Smithers, 2007) – as well as 
relatively ineffective in changing pupil sorting (Allen et al., 2010). 
 
In June 2007, Gordon Brown replaced Tony Blair as leader of the Labour party and prime 
minister. There were some initial signs that the Brown government might have been willing 
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to confront some of these issues —with talk of an ‘egalitarian project’ even being heard in 
the Brown camp (Wilby, 2007). As Fiona Millar pointed out at the time, ‘the words 
“diversity” and “choice”, the mantras of education policy through the Thatcher, Major and 
Blair years’ did not even feature in the first Commons statement by Ed Balls, Brown’s 
Secretary of State for Children, Schools and Families (Balls, 2007a; Millar, 2007). 
Furthermore, that same minister’s first major speech outside parliament indicated that a 
wider children’s agenda would be as important as the standards agenda in his newly-
created department and highlighted the important links between them (Balls, 2007b). In 
particular, the new government also signalled a greater role for local authorities in the 
planning of new academies and indicated that such schools should be seen as part of their 
local family of schools rather than lying outside them. This change of focus appeared not to 
be merely rhetorical, backed as it was by Public Service Agreement delivery targets for the 
Department for Children, Schools and Families that related in large part to narrowing the 
gap in educational achievement between pupils from different backgrounds (Baker, 2007). 
Nevertheless, little substantive change in policy or outcomes could be detected. It was 
unclear how far a stronger social justice agenda could be reconciled with the electoral logic 
that had so influenced the policies of the Blair government. As Peter Wilby (2007) put it, ‘a 
Brown government will need courage and ingenuity to reconcile egalitarian ambitions with 
political realities’, and, in the end, it proved unable to do so. 
 
The Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition 2010-15 
At the time New Labour left office in 2010 the socio-economic attainment gap remained 
very real. The Coalition government that was elected to replace New Labour set an 
ambitious goal of ‘closing’ this gap as part of a wider commitment to increasing social 
mobility, which it claimed had stalled under New Labour (HM Government, 2011). The 
general thrust of its policies was to continue and accelerate the emphasis on seeking 
improvement through school autonomy, competition and choice that, as we have seen, had 
been pioneered by Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government and continued by New 
Labour under Tony Blair if not with quite the same enthusiasm under Gordon Brown 
(Whitty, 2008). 
 
While the academies policy of the Blair government had sought to use academy status 
mainly to prioritise the replacement or improvement of failing schools in disadvantaged 
areas, the Conservative-led Coalition potentially extended this status to virtually all schools. 
Schools highly rated by Ofsted, a disproportionate number of which were in more affluent 
areas, could be granted academy status automatically if they so desired. Meanwhile, 
parents, teachers and others were encouraged to open publicly funded ‘free schools’, 
which, like academies, were outside local authority jurisdiction. Neither academies nor free 
schools are bound by statute to teach the National Curriculum, nor do they have to employ 
qualified teachers (though most do both at the moment). They are their own admissions 
authorities. This policy has been reinforced by a wider emphasis on establishing a ’school-
led system’ in which improvement is fostered through school-to-school support.   
It remains an open question whether such policies (subsequently continued by the majority 
Conservative government elected in 2105) will help to ‘close’ the attainment gap or, as 
some critics have suggested, effectively ‘open’ it up again. So far, around 60 per cent of 
English secondary schools and nearly 10 per cent of primary schools have academy or free 
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school status, and an increasing number of them are being linked in academy ‘chains’. 
Recent attempts to assess the evidence have come to no firm conclusions about the impact 
of these policies. The House of Commons Education Committee argued that ‘current 
evidence does not allow us to draw conclusions on whether academies in themselves are a 
positive force for change’ and ‘agree[d] with Ofsted that it is too early to draw conclusions 
on the quality of education provided by free schools or their broader system impact (House 
of Commons Education Committee, 2015; see also McNally, 2015). What is clear is that, 
although some of these new schools are in disadvantaged areas or where there is a shortage 
of school places, others are in middle class areas and where there is already a surplus of 
places, while those free schools located in disadvantaged areas have not necessarily 
attracted disadvantaged children (Green et al., 2014; Morris, 2015). 
Nevertheless, some of the other policies adopted by the Coalition reflected the social justice 
agenda of the Liberal Democrat party whose votes gave the coalition a majority in 
parliament. Among the policies that were strongly influenced by Liberal Democrat thinking 
was a commitment to address the attainment gap through a ‘pupil premium’ to be paid on 
top of the normal grant for every school age pupil in receipt of free school meals in state 
schools. This was consistent with the earlier trend under New Labour of linking resources to 
individuals in need, regardless of the neighbourhood in which they are receiving their 
schooling. The premium was subsequently increased and extended and, although the 
money was not ring-fenced or mandated for particular purposes, monitoring of its use by 
Ofsted was intended to ensure that it was used to benefit the education of the 
disadvantaged. Early surveys were not particularly encouraging in this respect, and 
suggested that too little of the money allocated through the pupil premium was being spent 
on activities known to boost attainment (Sutton Trust, 2012; Ofsted, 2012). However, later 
surveys were somewhat more positive about its role in narrowing the gap (Ofsted, 2014). 
Unfortunately, the pupil premium was introduced at a time of expenditure cuts in other 
areas, which is likely to undermine its potential impact (Lupton and Thomson, 2015). 
Ultimately, the level of the premium was never such that it would act as an incentive for 
schools, in a marketised system, to enrol a more diverse intake of pupils in terms of socio-
economic background or prior attainment.  
 
There was also considerable controversy about whether the Coalition government’s 
curriculum policies would help to close the gap. As well as admissions, this is another area in 
which the effects of marketization have been evident within the English system. One 
Coalition policy was to reduce the number of ‘equivalent’ qualifications that are permitted 
to be used in school performance tables as alternatives to the GCSE qualifications at age 16. 
Schools’ use of these qualifications, many of them poorly regarded, had mushroomed under 
the New Labour government, particularly so among academies (de Waal, 2009), and 
particularly to the detriment of more disadvantaged pupils. The Coalition’s intention was to 
reverse this trend and place a much stronger emphasis on a return to conventional 
academic qualifications – for all pupils. Following the Department for Education-
commissioned Wolf review, the Coalition removed a large number of vocational 
qualifications deemed to be of poor quality and in little demand among employers. It also 
strengthened the requirements for English and mathematics, asking all young people to 
achieve GCSE grade C or above by age 18. But perhaps the flagship curriculum reform under 
the Coalition was the ‘English Baccalaureate’ (EBacc), which was introduced in 2011. This is 
an award to pupils, but also effectively a new performance measure for secondary schools, 
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based on the percentage of pupils achieving high grades in specified subjects, i.e. English, 
mathematics, sciences, history or geography, and a foreign language. This seems, initially at 
least, to have affected socially disadvantaged students adversely as they are more likely to 
have been exposed to alternative curricula than more advantaged students on a university 
entrance track (DfE, 2014). For example, Gillborn (2014) has suggested that the introduction 
of the EBacc, ‘restored White odds of success to 2.20 (more than double the Black rate), a 
rate not seen since 2003’.  
 
Alongside, Coalition and subsequent Conservative government ministers have claimed that 
they are encouraging the development of high quality vocational qualifications and that this 
is reflected in their championing of apprenticeships as an alternative (and/or an alternative 
route) to university. In its governance of the further education sector, aside from ring-
fencing funding for apprenticeships, the Coalition removed any role for central planning and 
funded provision on the basis of student demand and outcomes alone. In adult skills, it 
discontinued central funding and introduced the expectation that employers and individuals 
would co-invest, including through income-contingent loads as per the funding model for 
higher education. Alongside, the Coalition introduced new performance indicators to inform 
the ‘consumer’. The Conservative government has continued this approach. The priority 
since 2015 has been to expand apprenticeship at scale, for which the government intends to 
use a new levy on employers. On paper, this would appear to offer a more coherent set of 
policies than has been the case in the further education sector for some time.   
 
A new era of network governance?  
In recent evidence to a House of Commons committee, Stephen Gorard stated that ‘there is 
strong evidence that diversification and fragmentation of what is intended to be a national 
system is linked to higher socio-economic segregation between schools, and all of the 
dangers that this entails’ (House of Commons Public Bill Committee, 2015).  
At the end of the period of Coalition government, the socio-economic attainment gap 
certainly remained a defining feature of the English educational system. There were plaudits 
for the success of education policy in London in this regard (albeit debate continues as to 
the relative significance of the apparent contributory factors – see Whitty et al., 2016, 
chapter 4), as well as for those academy chains that have built their names on turning 
around the performance of the schools with which they work (Hutchings et al., 2014). But 
there were also continuing concerns about the lack of progress in narrowing the gap 
elsewhere in the system (Wilshaw, 2013). The question that, not only Gorard, but many 
commentators are now raising – after three decades of policy underpinned by diversity and 
choice agendas – is whether England still has an education system in place in the sense that 
had existed between the landmark 1944 Education Act and the 1979 Thatcher government. 
David Bell, a former Permanent Secretary at the education department under New Labour 
and the Coalition, has offered his own reflections on the English school reforms of recent 
decades. He has suggested that, with the ever reducing role of local authorities, we are 
probably moving towards a ‘system of many small systems’: 
‘Messiness’ in terms of structures will be a natural by-product of radical structural 
reform as we move from a standardised national system to a system of many small 
systems. I don’t have a single solution to offer, nor do I necessarily think there 
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should be one, as the end-point of these school reforms hasn’t been reached yet 
(Bell, 2012). 
He was thinking here of small systems of schools in particular, with academy chains, a few 
effective local authorities, and federations of schools led by teaching schools or successful 
individual school leaders. Interestingly, his use of the term ‘messiness’ resonates with 
Stephen Ball’s characterisation of postmodern education systems as ‘untidy’ (Ball, 2011). 
Greany (2015) regards the new landscape of education, particularly as it developed under 
the Coalition government, as ‘more fragmented, and yet more networked’ (p. 125). This 
applies both at the level of schools and the new policy players that have been encouraged 
by successive governments. Ball and Junemann (2012) discuss such trends in the governance 
of education in England in terms of ‘network governance’. In particular, they channel our 
attention to the range of actors now involved in the governance of education in England, 
including the growing influence of business and philanthropy. Drawing eclectically on 
various types of network theory, Ball and Junemann show the links between leading 
individuals and institutions involved in debates around and the formulation of education 
policy. We can see in their account evidence of new actors sometimes steering policy, 
setting directions and influencing the terms of debate in a way that arguably was the 
province of government and just a few key partners in the past. These actors do so directly, 
contributing to the debate, but they also have influence through their involvement in 
sponsoring and running schools.  
In our view, however, it is questionable that Ball’s and Junemann’s examples of network 
governance constitute a step change in education policy making and one that is here to stay. 
For example, it is unclear how far and in what sense network governance and multiple 
partnerships have actually replaced, as opposed to complemented, older ways of governing 
or even the so-called new public management. Ball and Junemann themselves warn of the 
dangers of overstating the case. It may be that we are seeing an increasingly complex 
version of the ‘steering at a distance’ framework that we identified earlier in this paper as 
the emergent mode of governance under Thatcherism and New Labour. Furthermore, new 
actors who fail in the eyes of governments do not survive as key players for long: the 
dramatic decline of the Specialist Schools and Academies Trust/The Schools Network as a 
significant voice provides just one illustration of this. The ‘partnering state’ can change its 
partners and reassign contracts as it wishes.  
It can also close its own ‘arm’s length’ agencies. Very soon into the Coalition administration, 
very little of the architecture of the New Labour years remained: all of the quangos we listed 
earlier were, among others, swiftly closed. Other agencies were merged, including, for 
example, the Training and Development Agency for Schools and the National College for 
Leadership of Schools and Children’s Services. Some of these organisations’ functions were 
taken back within the education department itself. The jury is perhaps still out on whether 
these changes reflected a genuine desire to remove unnecessary bureaucracy and hand 
power to the people or an audacious attempt to centralise it in the hands of the secretary of 
state.  
With the increasing marginalisation of local authorities in education policy making and 
delivery, together with this ‘bonfire of the quangos’ (or NDPBs), direct government control 
does appear to have increased. The question is then how the state retains sufficient capacity 
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to manage what is left of the ‘system’. Accountability in the form of performance indicators 
and tables remains the primary lever – the only lever – through which the centre can direct 
and shape the focus of autonomous schools. We have indicated how use of these indicators 
has evolved. In addition, it became apparent early on that the centre cannot manage tens of 
thousands of schools alone. Whether for reasons of ‘efficiency’ or ‘local democratic 
accountability’, there have been mounting calls for the recreation of a ‘middle tier’ of 
education governance in England (e.g. Blunkett, 2014). To date, the Conservative 
government’s response has been to establish Regional Schools Commissioners, although 
how they fit in to the overall system of accountability is still unclear (see, for example, 
House of Commons Education Committee, 2016). The English approach is a far cry from the 
still significant role of democratically elected local government in Scotland or Wales (West, 
2015). 
Future policy  
2015 saw the replacement of the Coalition with a majority Conservative government and, 
accordingly, a more clear-cut policy agenda on schools: moving even more to a system of 
‘autonomous’ and competing schools/chains, working to stronger accountability levers. 
At the centre of schools policy remains the further acceleration of the academisation of 
secondary – and now primary – schools, including through the free schools policy. There will 
be forced conversion to academy status for ‘coasting’ or ‘failing’ schools. All ‘good’ schools 
will be allowed to expand, including grammar schools. In October 2015 the secretary of 
state authorised the expansion of a Kent grammar school – the first such expansion in 50 
years – once again putting the grammar school question and overt selection centre stage in 
education policy.  
The possible brakes on schools’ and chains’ enthusiasm to expand include a dearth of 
effective sponsors, and the risks of expanding (for chains and individual schools) under the 
new accountability measures. These measures include baseline tests and tests for pupils 
who do not reach expected levels in English and mathematics at the end of Key Stage 2; the 
requirement that virtually all pupils take GCSEs in the EBacc subjects; compulsory resits for 
those not reaching Level 4; Progress 8 (pupils’ progress across eight subjects, including at 
least five EBacc subjects); and performance measures and inspection for academy chains. 
The party’s manifesto pledge was that Ofsted would be unable to award its highest ratings 
to schools that refused to teach the EBacc subjects. 
The aforementioned recent decision by Nicky Morgan to allow the Kent grammar school to 
expand by opening an annex in a nearby town is of considerable symbolic importance. Seen 
by critics as effectively opening a new grammar school, this move sits in stark contrast to 
the politics of Jeremy Corbyn, the newly elected leader of the Labour party, who reportedly 
separated from his then wife due to her decision to send their child to a grammar school.  
Corbyn’s position also stands in contrast to that of New Labour ministers who sent their 
children to a variety of new types of school, including in the case of Harriet Harman, a 
grammar school a considerable distance from her home.  
It is therefore possible that the strong sense of continuity in policy and practice between 
successive governments of different political hues has run its course and we are witnessing 
a return to sharp differentiation between the parties of a sort we have not seen since the 
1980s. If this is the case and a Labour party under Corbyn’s leadership were to be elected to 
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government in 2020, it is possible that England might return to a more social democratic 
approach to education governance, and therefore once again have more in common with 
other UK jurisdictions. Labour’s education spokesperson has already suggested that local 
authorities in England would be given greater powers over all their local schools under a 
Labour government.  
At the time of writing, it seems more likely that England will continue along the trajectory 
favoured by all its governments since the 1980s and the question will be whether it remains 
an outlier or sets a precedent for the rest of the UK and perhaps the world beyond. 
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